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The landscape for ‘judicialisation from below’ is changing in Scotland. The environmental movement
has harnessed the provisions of the Aarhus Convention—an international agreement guaranteeing
procedural rights in matters of environmental decision-making—in litigation efforts. In doing so liti-
gants have begun to signiﬁcantly challenge the structure of opportunities for contesting and overturn-
ing decisions of the state when it comes to environmental policy. Rather than undermining
representative democracy this article argues this process constitutes a democratisation of access to
justice.
Introduction
In the last 20 years non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups
have begun to play an increasingly signiﬁcant and diversiﬁed role in environmental policy-
making. They participate, to varying extents, in a range of regulatory processes: from
agenda-setting to policy-drafting, from monitoring to implementation and enforcement
(Bugdahn 2008; McCormick 1999; Princen and Finger 1994; Raustiala 1997; Wapner 1996).
Scholars have also noted increasing levels of representation of NGOs and community
groups in policy-relevant venues where they had been previously absent. Actors in the
environmental movement have sought to enforce, challenge and inﬂuence policy in judicial
arenas. This has long been the case in the United States: in 1988 the executive director of
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund said that ‘[l]itigation is the most important thing the
environmental movement has done over the past ﬁfteen years’ (quoted in Cole and Foster
2001: 30). While the turn to the courts by European environmental activists is more recent,
the mobilisation of law in this policy realm is increasingly evident across jurisdictions and at
different levels of governance (Bo¨rzel 2006; Cichowski 2007; Kelemen 2011; Vanhala 2012).
This article asks how civil society actors leverage legal norms and judicial institutions at
different scales of governance. It explores how this leveraging activity may facilitate judicialisa-
tion—deﬁned here as the expansion of the role of courts and judges in determining public
policy outcomes (Hirschl 2008). This article illustrates how legal mobilisation—‘the process
by which individuals make claims about their legal rights and pursue lawsuits to defend or
develop those rights’ (Epp 1998: 18)—may be constrained by procedural rules limiting
access to courts, such as restrictive standing doctrine on who can take a case and punitive
cost rules on the spending required to take a case and the ﬁnancial risk if a case is lost
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(Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003). However, it also serves to highlight the agency these
groups exhibit in drawing on international law and approaching multiple venues to challenge
the constraining conditions that limit their mobilisation activity (Cichowski 2007; Vanhala
2012).
The conceptual relationship between processes of legal mobilisation and judicialisation
is a complex one. The term ‘judicialisation’ is focused more on the substantive public policy
‘outputs’ of legal disputes whereas ‘legal mobilisation’ is more focused on ‘inputs’ to the judi-
cial process as well as the broad range of outcomes of these disputes (policy losses, procedural
victories and impacts on social movements themselves). By using the term ‘judicialisation from
below’ I do not mean to suggest that groups are always successful in determining policy out-
comes through their litigation campaigns but rather that in mobilising the law they encourage
public policy debates to move into judicial arenas.
The term ‘civil society’ actor has a long history in the study of social movements. Paul
Wapner (2000) described the associations and groups as ‘the bonds and allegiances that
arise through sustained, voluntary, non-commercial interaction’ (p. 266). Within a democracy,
civil society serves as a counterbalance to state power and can channel societal demands to
the state more effectively than individuals can alone. NGOs and other groups are also
playing an increasingly signiﬁcant role in the implementation and monitoring of law,
whether domestic or international, and can act as ‘whistle blowers’ when states fall behind
on their commitments (McCormick 1999; O’Neill 2009). I argue drawing on evidence from a
case study of Scotland that judicialisation from below the nation-state (Epp 1998) does not
necessarily undermine representative democracy. On the contrary, it can play a democratising
role by ensuring effective enforcement of policies decided by majoritarian institutions, by
enhancing access to justice so that all members of society have equal recourse to the
courts and by expanding the range of voices heard in court-led policy-inﬂuencing processes.
This article is based on a case study of the impact of the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (known more commonly as
the Aarhus Convention after the Danish city in which it was conceived), which entered into
force in Scotland in 2001. The Convention was developed largely to promote democracy
within post-communist Europe, but it has also had an impact on policy in Western European
countries thanks to strategic litigation efforts by a number of environmental NGOs. This article
explains how this treaty, largely seen as symbolic by its Western European signatories, is none-
theless proving transformative in who is participating in environmental politics. The research
offers a nuanced picture of the way in which civil society actors shape the legal and regulatory
structures as much as they may be moulded and inﬂuenced by them (Cichowski 2007;
Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003). It sees NGOs not as automatons operating within a structure
that largely determines their behaviour but rather as active agents that strategically transform
the structures within which they are situated.
The ﬁrst section of this article introduces the Aarhus Convention, while the second
section discusses the research methods and discusses why the Scottish jurisdiction merits
focus. The third section presents the case study: it analyses key legal cases and other empirical
data to trace continuity and change in judicial policy on who can access justice and at what
cost. It shows how Scottish NGOs and activists have harnessed the provisions of the Aarhus
Convention in litigation efforts. In doing so, it suggests that NGOs have begun to inﬂuence
the structure of opportunities for contesting and overturning decisions of the state in environ-
mental policy. Civil society activity in the courts may expand the power of courts in the realm of
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environmental policy-making (though the evidence for this is relatively weak as courts are
reluctant partners in this process), and it may also help to democratise access to justice. The
concluding section offers an assessment and suggestions for future research.
The Aarhus Convention
The Aarhus Convention was adopted on 25 June 1998 as part of the ‘Environment for
Europe’ process (Wates 2005). It represents a novel type of environmental agreement in its pro-
cedural rights-based approach and its imposition of obligations on member states and on the
EC (also a member) vis-a`-vis civil society. The Convention also refers to the goal of protecting
the right of every person, both present and future generations, to live in an environment ade-
quate for health and well-being.1 The Convention grew from the embryo of Principle 10 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), which promoted the idea that indi-
viduals should have appropriate access to information, opportunities for participation in
decision-making and effective access to judicial processes. Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot
(2003) note that ‘the emphasis on public involvement is one of a range of responses to a
certain disillusionment with the authority of the state (or the EC) to regulate for environmental
protection’.
The Aarhus Convention is unique among international treaties in its reﬂection of the dis-
tinctive role of citizen groups and NGOs in enforcing environmental law. Articles 4 to 9 regulate
in a detailed manner the three pillars of the Convention:
(1) access to environmental information as well as collection and dissemination of environ-
mental information;
(2) public participation in decisions on speciﬁc activities, public participation concerning
plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment, and public participation
during the preparation of executive regulations and/or generally applicable legally
binding normative instruments; and
(3) access to justice.
The third pillar of the Aarhus Convention, of particular focus here, is concerned with
access to environmental justice. It grants rights to members of the public, including environ-
mental organisations, to challenge the legality of decisions by public authorities that are
contrary to the provisions of national laws relating to the environment. Article 9(4) of the
Convention requires that procedures for rights to access must ‘provide adequate and effective
remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate and be fair, equitable, timely and not
prohibitively expensive’.
The UK ratiﬁed the Aarhus Convention on 24 February 2005 and became a full party to
the Convention 90 days after this date. Richard Macrory and Ned Westaway (2011) write that in
the UK ‘compliance with Aarhus was not considered a signiﬁcant challenge – the prevailing
view was that the Convention was largely aimed at the emerging democracies in Eastern
Europe’ (p. 315). In announcing the ratiﬁcation in 2005, a Department of Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs spokesperson said that the UK was already living up to its Aarhus
commitments:
Over recent years, the EU and the UK have taken steps to improve people’s ability to have a
say in the quality of their environment. We are also encouraging other countries to make pro-
gress in this area, in particular in the Eastern European, Caucasus and Central Asian Region. UK
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ratiﬁcation of the Aarhus Convention conﬁrms our commitment to the best principles of
environmental democracy, both at home and abroad.
As far as policy-makers were concerned, the country was adhering satisfactorily to the
principles of environmental democracy underpinning the Convention. For this reason, a
case study of the deployment of the norms contained within the Aarhus Convention by civil
society groups provides a useful illustrative case study of judicialisation from below.
Case Study Justification
Scotland provides a particularly fertile context in which to explore the judicialisation and
legal mobilisation dynamic. The UK government was a long-standing supporter of the Aarhus
Convention and one of the early signatories (Macrory and Westaway 2011). The UK has a well-
developed system of environmental law, opportunities for public participation and access to
environmental information as well as more general provisions on the freedom of information.
In England and Wales, rules of standing have been fairly liberal since the early 1990s, allowing
individuals and NGOs to challenge the legality of decision-making processes by public auth-
orities through judicial review procedures (Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003; Macrory and
Westaway 2011; Vanhala 2012).
However, Scotland operates under a different legal system: Scots law. Two deﬁning fea-
tures of Scots law justify its selection as a case study worthy of focus. These are restrictive
standing doctrine, that limits who can take cases to court, and deterrent costs rules,
meaning those who wish to take legal cases face the risk of paying the expenses incurred
by the other side if they lose (McCartney 2011). Scotland has a distinct civil society sector
and, among the larger NGOs, Friends of the Earth Scotland (FoES) is separate from Friends
of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland and both the World Wide Fund for Nature
(WWF) and Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) have separate administrations in
Scotland. Interviews with representatives from several different NGOs highlighted their reluc-
tance to use legal mobilisation. While the RSPB had previously taken legal cases in Scotland, in
1998 it suffered a major loss in a case that it had brought in collaboration with the WWF; a court
ordered the NGOs to pay almost £200,000 in costs. The Head of Policy for RSPB Scotland said of
the experience, ‘we’ve learned we don’t get access to justice’ (19 May 2011). Similarly, FoES had
decided after an early anti-roads campaign experience that pursuing legal action was too
costly and risky (interview, 19 May 2011). The procedural rules and empirical evidence
suggest that the Scottish jurisdiction is a particularly hostile one for groups seeking to turn
to the courts. While the focus on this jurisdiction is admittedly a narrow one, the case is none-
theless analytically useful in serving as an ‘unlikely case’ for NGO and community group acti-
vism in the judicial realm (Eckstein 1975).
This research draws on original data gathered from judicial review actions taken by
Scottish NGOs, community groups and individual activists. The cases were identiﬁed
through secondary literature on environmental law in Scotland. I draw on court records,
NGO newsletters, annual reports, press releases and a dozen interviews conducted in Scot-
land between April 2010 and April 2012 with NGO decision-makers, lawyers and legal
experts that are knowledgeable of the Scottish context. The analysis traces how the
norms contained with an international convention have been given life in civil society liti-
gation campaigns in this jurisdiction. It seeks to shed light on the dynamics of judicialisation
from below the state.
312 LISA VANHALA
Access to Justice in Scotland
Because both the UK and the European Union have signed the Convention, the Scottish
executive is obliged to implement its standards. The relationship between the UK government
and Scotland in implementing and enforcing environmental law is laid out in the existing
devolution settlement; the Scotland Act 1998; and the 2001 Memorandum of Understanding
and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom Government, Scottish Minis-
ters, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive Com-
mittee.2 Under this legislation, the Scottish parliament has competence to address all policy
areas in Scotland except for those reserved for the Westminster parliament, for example inter-
national relations, energy and some elements of transport. Environmental protection is thus
largely a devolved competence although the boundary is not always clear (Reid 2009; Ross
et al. 2009).
In regards to the ﬁrst two pillars of the Aarhus Convention, Scotland—like the rest of the
UK—is in compliance. Two key pieces of legislation—the Environmental Information (Scot-
land) Regulations 2004 and the Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005—implement
the provisions of Aarhus in Scotland. However, the provisions on access to justice have
been more controversial. The 2008 DEFRA Aarhus Convention Implementation Report lays
out in detail the differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK in terms of how the Con-
vention’s provisions have been implemented under the ﬁrst two pillars. However, in addres-
sing the access to justice provisions, while containing an extensive discussion of what
England and Wales had undertaken in order to meet the requirements, in regards to Scotland
it simply states: ‘Scotland advise us that their system complies with the requirements of article
9(4) [on access to justice not being prohibitively expensive]’ (DEFRA 2008). The brevity and
phrasing are telling.
In order to implement the access to justice provisions, regulations have been introduced
which extend ‘title and interest’—the Scottish test as to whether an individual or organisation
can pursue a case—to environmental NGOs. However, the Pollution Prevention and Control
(Public Participation etc.) (Scotland) Regulations 2005 and the Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2006 only relate to cases where there has been
an allegation of breach of Environmental Impact Assessment provisions—not to broader
environmental decision-making which is the remit of the Aarhus Convention. Further, it only
allows environmental NGOs to take action, not individuals or local groups. In a 2011 report
on access to justice, Tipping the Scales: Complying with the Aarhus Convention on Access to
Environmental Justice, FoES argued that:
Compliance with the third Pillar, on access to justice in environmental matters, is critical to
ensure that the procedures established by the former two [pillars] are properly adhered to;
however, in this respect, Scotland falls considerably short of meeting its international obli-
gations. Aarhus demands broad and affordable access to justice, but the reality in Scotland
is very different. It can be extremely expensive to undertake legal proceedings (environmental
or not) in Scotland . . . In addition, rules on standing – and the interpretation of these rules by
the courts – are extremely restrictive, making it very difﬁcult for individuals, communities and
NGOs to demonstrate that they have ‘title and interest’ to take an environmental case. (FoES
2011: 6)
In recent years, these perceived failures of compliance were implicated in a series of legal
cases. Environmental NGOs in Scotland have been involved in these litigation efforts in a
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number of different ways; from providing funding to individual litigants and submitting third-
party interventions to using the narratives of lack of access to justice to mobilise their consti-
tuencies and pressure the Scottish government.
Two signiﬁcant issues have proven particularly problematic in the Scottish context: rules
on standing and the cost risk associated with litigation. Generally, rules on standing—known
as ‘title and interest’ in Scots law—have been derived from a private law context. A person with
‘title’ is someone who is a party to a legal relationship, with the focus on ownership, contract,
trust or other ﬁduciary relationship. In practice this has implications for which societal interests
are represented in courts in Scotland. Particularly in the realm of environmental democracy—
where issues are often problems of the commons or of nature and hence not of concern to a
single individual—this understanding of who can access the courts means the environment’s
interests will not be spoken for (Stone 1972).
Like in England and Wales, the cost and risk of litigation is high in Scotland and the
concept of public expenses orders (PEOs) has been developed in Scottish case law. A PEO
caps the amount in a legal case of the other side’s costs the petitioner would have to pay if
she lost the case. However, this is a recent phenomenon and to date only two PEOs have
been issued. In 2006, as part of an anti-roads campaign, FoES sought to overturn the Scottish
executive’s decision to permit an extension of the M74 motorway through southern Glasgow.
The NGO applied for a PEO but the court refused to grant one, suggesting that the desirability
of PEOs being introduced in Scotland should be pursued through the Court of Session Rules
Council, the body responsible for addressing procedural rules in the court, and not through
the judiciary. According to the NGO’s access to justice report, FoES ‘eventually and reluctantly
withdrew the case to conserve scarce funds and in the face of a potential liability for expenses’
(FoES 2011: 45).
Another case, Mary Buchan Forbes v. Aberdeenshire Council and Trump International Golf
Links [2010] CSOH 1, that was scuppered by procedural barriers to justice, concerned Donald
Trump’s controversial golf and hotel development in Aberdeenshire. The petitioner struggled
with issues both of standing and of costs. In 2009, Mary Forbes, a local resident, sought to halt
development at the site. She alleged that the works were environmentally damaging and that
the respondents did not follow correct Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and consul-
tation procedures. The petitioner sought an interim interdict (an injunction) to stop the
works on nearby sand dunes while her judicial review was in the court, but this was denied.
In the 2010 decision, the judge cited the Aarhus Convention and noted that requirements
to interpret the test of standing must be in line ‘with the objective of giving the public con-
cerned wide access to justice’. Forbes lived only a kilometre from the works being carried
out, but she failed to show that she was ‘affected in some identiﬁable way’ and did not demon-
strate sufﬁcient interest. Paradoxically, Forbes had failed to get a PEO because they are
conﬁned only to public interest cases, and she had been refused assistance with the costs
of her case because her ‘application did not meet the “reasonableness” test for legal aid’.
According to the Scottish Legal Aid Board, legal aid was refused ‘on the basis of information
available to the Board there were other people with an interest in the case who it would
appear could fund or make a contribution to funding an action’ (Scottish Legal Aid Board
2011). When Forbes lost her initial hearing, and faced the prospect of paying thousands of
pounds of the other side’s costs, she dropped the proceedings.
Another case that has evoked the Aarhus Convention in Scotland is McGinty v. Scottish
Ministers [2010] CSOH 5. Marco McGinty sought to judicially review the Scottish government’s
proposed development of a new coal plant near his home in Hunterston, North Ayrshire. The
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proposed site is classiﬁed as a Site of Special Scientiﬁc Interest (SSSI) for its wildlife. Both FoES
and RSPB Scotland helped to ﬁnancially support McGinty in the judicial review and partici-
pated in media efforts to raise awareness of the problematic nature of accessing justice (inter-
views, 19 May 2011, 3 May 2012). In some ways the progress of the McGinty case to date
represents a waltz of one step forward and two steps back for Scottish compliance with the
Aarhus Convention. An early hearing of the case resulted in the ﬁrst ever PEO being
awarded. The judge, citing the developing case law on protective cost orders (PCOs) in
England, granted the petitioner a PEO and capped McGinty’s liability for the defendant’s
costs at £30,000. The amount is high, particularly when considering the estimated cost of
up to £80,000 he would face in bringing the case himself after being denied legal aid. None-
theless, the PEO constituted an important symbolic liberalisation of the cost rules.
However, in another hearing, the McGinty petition was also challenged by the respon-
dents on grounds of standing (‘title and interest’) and timeliness (‘mora’). The judge in this
case found in October 2011 that McGinty’s occasional use of the site, ﬁve miles from his
home, for bird-watching might entitle him to ‘title’ but did not meet the criteria of possessing
sufﬁcient ‘interest’. Lord Brailsford held that:
He does not in my opinion have a ‘real and legitimate’ or ‘real and practical’ interest to bring
proceedings. He does not reside adjacent to the site and is not therefore a neighbour. His use
of the site is limited, intermittent and non-essential. The type of usage he exercises over the
site could in fact be exercised over any area of land to which the public has access at any
location in Scotland. He does not sue as a member or representative of a group or organis-
ation with title or interest. (Para. 26)
The petition was ultimately dismissed on standing and timeliness. In a press release in
response to the judgment, McGinty said:
I am deeply disappointed in this ruling, which has failed to overturn the manifestly unfair
planning and legal processes that led to Hunterston being declared a national development.
This is a sad reﬂection on Scotland and the Scottish planning and legal systems. It would
appear that the value of the natural environment, as well as the principles of fairness, open-
ness and democracy are set to one side when wealthy developers like Peel are involved.
(WWF Scotland 2011)
Since then, to my knowledge, only one other PEO has been granted in Scotland. A cam-
paign group, Road Sense, and an individual petitioner who was the chairman of the group,
lodged a review of the Scottish government’s decision to construct the Aberdeen Western Per-
ipheral Route (AWPR). The proposed Aberdeen Bypass would consist of a new four-lane
highway that would loop around the west and the north of the city of Aberdeen. On 7 May
2009, Road Sense made a communication to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee
alleging non-compliance by the UK with its Convention obligations in the proposed construc-
tion of the AWPR. The Compliance Committee rejected these complaints after having
considered written submissions, and a hearing attended by UK and Scottish government
representatives. In short, the Committee was satisﬁed that the whole process of consultation,
including the public participation through the statutory authorisation process, meant that it
could not be said that the Scottish government was in breach.
At that point, the campaigners continued to pursue the case in the Scottish courts. In
February 2011, Road Sense were granted a PEO that capped the campaigners’ potential liability
for the other side’s costs at £40,000. In the ruling, which references the Aarhus Convention
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multiple times, the judge nonetheless took a subjective approach in assessing the amount at
which the cap should be set. The cap was established at exactly the amount Road Sense esti-
mated that they could raise from existing funds. In England, in the Garner case, this subjective
approach to the granting of PEOs was explicitly rejected by Sullivan LJ as being inconsistent
with the objectives of Aarhus. The Scottish government conﬁrmed that they would challenge
Road Sense’s title to take the case, and the campaign group chose to drop the action and leave
William Walton, one local resident, as the sole petitioner. In William Walton v. Scottish Ministers
[2012] CSIH 19 XA53/10 the appeal to the Inner House of the Court of Session in February 2012
the judge, who looked at European Law, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee’s
decision as well as domestic law, dismissed the case.
In the last year there have been signiﬁcant developments in relation to the law on title
and interest. Most notably, environmental campaigners have heralded the UK Supreme Court
decision in AXA General Insurance Limited and others (Appellants) v. The Lord Advocate and
others (Respondents) (Scotland) 2011 UKSC 46 decided by the UK Supreme Court on 12
October 2011 immediately after the McGinty ruling. FoES participated in the case as a third-
party intervener despite it not being a case that explicitly addressed issues of environmental
law.3 In the case, a group of insurance companies which had undertaken to indemnify employ-
ers against liability for negligence sought to challenge the lawfulness of a piece of Scottish
legislation, the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009. The Act provided
that asbestos-related pleural plaques and other asbestos-related conditions constitute
personal injury. The First Division court had found that some of the respondents—individuals
who have been diagnosed with pleural plaques caused by negligent exposure to asbestos—
lacked title and interest and should not have been permitted to be parties to the proceedings.
In their written brief, FoES argued that they were intervening on the issue of standing for NGOs
to bring judicial review proceedings in Scotland in relation to matters of public interest. They
wrote:
FoES is a body with a genuine concern for the environment, who with its particular experience
in environmental matters, its access to experts in the relevant realms of science and technol-
ogy and environmental policy is in a position to mount carefully selected, focused, relevant
and well argued legal challenges . . . FoES do not wish to take legal action on a frequent or
regular basis. However, it considers that there are a number of environmental issues in Scot-
land that are unlikely to be litigated by any other organisation or person. (Friends of the Earth
Scotland 2011)
The Supreme Court dismissed the insurance companies’ appeal. Importantly, it also allowed
the cross-appeal by the third to tenth respondents—individuals diagnosed with pleural
plaques who were challenging the lower court’s ﬁnding that they did not have title and inter-
est to be parties to the case. The decision represents a decisive shift on the issue of standing in
Scottish public law. In their judgment, the two Scottish judges on the UK Supreme Court clearly
elucidated a rejection of the approach derived from private law in terms of title and interest.
Lord Hope, citing the arguments put forth by FoES, held that:
As for the substantive law, I think that the time has come to recognise that the private law rule
that title and interest has to be shown has no place in applications to the court’s supervisory
jurisdiction that lie in the ﬁeld of public law. The word ‘standing’ provides a more appropriate
indication of the approach that should be adopted. (Para. 62)
Lord Reed reiterated the point:
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In my opinion, the time has come when it should be recognised by the courts that Lord Dune-
din’s dictum [on title and interest] pre-dates the modern development of public law, that it is
rooted in private law concepts which are not relevant in the context of applications to the
supervisory jurisdiction, and that its continuing inﬂuence in that context has a damaging
effect on the development of public law in Scotland. This unsatisfactory situation should
not be allowed to persist. (Para. 171)
Many of the points made in the judgment echo FoES’s intervention and in the end the Court
concurred with the NGO’s idea that the separation of title and interest serves no useful func-
tion and that the time was ripe ‘to free Scots public law from its private law shackles, and to
recognise “sufﬁcient interest” as the proper test for standing in judicial review’ (Friends of the
Earth Scotland 2011).
The landscape for environmental justice is thus changing rapidly in Scotland. While
continuing to face high barriers in Scotland, environmental groups as litigants and interveners
have sought other venues—at both the international and the UK level—within which to
pursue their goals. By taking cases both on different policy issues (asbestos) and in different
jurisdictions (before the Aarhus Compliance Committee, the EU and the UK Supreme Court)
civil society groups mobilised other forms of law which created the possibility of spillover
effects. As a result of this multi-level, cross-cutting approach, it seems that the Aarhus Conven-
tion may have a signiﬁcant impact on whether groups and individuals will be able to access
justice in Scotland.
Conclusion
NGOs and community groups in Scotland have used litigation efforts to highlight and
inﬂuence the restrictive nature of accessing justice. The costs and risks associated with litigation
and rules of standing in Scotland have regularly hampered the efforts of green NGOs—aswell as
local groups and individual activists—to challenge government decisions. This hasmeant that it
has largely been corporate interests that have been represented in courtrooms. In response,
environmental NGOs have tried to soften these barriers to justice. The norms contained
within the Aarhus Convention have been deployed in Scottish courts, before the UK Supreme
Court and before the Aarhus Compliance Committee. In a number of instances these norms
have been acknowledged, granting them legitimacy, even in cases where they did not make
the difference that grassroots actors would have hoped for in the ﬁnal judgments.
While some may argue that the use of litigation diminishes democracy because it allows
groups to circumvent the legislative process, the ﬁndings of this study suggest otherwise. First,
the groups explored here are relying on international legal instruments that have been adopted
and ratiﬁed through democratic processes. This concerns both substantive law, such as national
and European environmental protection legislation, as well as procedural rules. Civil society
cannot encourage judicialisation on its own: groups require both a legal basis as well as oppor-
tunities to participate in the judicial system. Legislatures and executives have created these legal
norms and procedural opportunities (Cichowski and Stone Sweet 2003).
Second, the courts are ﬁlled with a broad range of societal interests. The critics are correct
when they note that the environmental movement is keen to pursue legal strategies. However,
their analysis ignores the corporate interests that have long beneﬁted from access to the court,
particularly at the stage of policy implementation where contestation may be more diffuse.
Hirschl (2004) and Bellamy (2008) argue that, compared to legislatures, unaccountable courts
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tend to domore to serve the interests of powerful corporate actors and vested interests. Critics of
judicialisation argue that a solution is to discourage policy debates in the courts. However,
another way to redress this imbalance is to empower their opponents and ensure that access
to justice is equal for all citizens. As Kelemen (2012) argues, for rights and norms to have any
real effect, litigants must be able to pursue legal claims. Democracy is not served if civil society
is unable to challenge the legality of the actions of businesses or the decisions of the state.
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NOTES
1. The United Kingdom explicitly included the following reservation when it signed and ratiﬁed
the treaty: ‘The United Kingdom understands the references in article 1 and the seventh pre-
ambular paragraph of this Convention to the “right” of every person “to live in an environ-
ment adequate to his or her health and well-being” to express an aspiration which
motivated the negotiation of this Convention and which is shared fully by the United
Kingdom. The legal rights which each Party undertakes to guarantee under article 1 are
limited to the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making and
access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Conven-
tion’ (Aarhus Convention 1998 Declarations and Reservations, available at http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_no¼XXVII-13&chapter¼27&lang¼en,
accessed 9 May 2012).
2. Devolution: Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements between the
United Kingdom Government, Scottish Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for
Wales and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
constitution/devolution/pubs/odpm_dev_600629.pdf, accessed 10 May 2012).
3. This was the ﬁrst time FoES had participated in the courts in this way. The organisation also
considered intervening in the Road Sense case before an out-of-court settlement on costs was
reached between the participants (interview, 3 May 2012).
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